

off a modern, professional fighting force to colonial populations (p. 66), while a focus on the educational attainment of recruits was designed to wash away the prejudiced ‘*y’a bon*’ images of African troops which lingered in the Metropole (p. 48). Measures intended to pacify soldiers could also project a modern image, such as sponsored trips to Mecca for Muslim soldiers which doubled up as opportunities for monitoring and propagandizing about the benefits of French development (p. 125). This was as much about creating images of modernity, as satisfying real demands for meaningful political reform.

The fourth and fifth chapters make clear the point outlined in the introduction, that for all of the African ‘*unsung heroes*’ (p. xx) in France’s army, those self-same soldiers were deployed in the maintenance of empire. Yet, as we see, this is not detailed in condemnation, but rather to complicate our understanding of colonial forces, and to document the difficulties they faced in active service. There is a sense of cruel irony (and bitter exploitation) in the deployment of African troops to carry out some of the most unsavoury aspects of colonial warfare. Ginio documents how in both Indochina and Algeria, African troops were ordered to carry out physical beatings and torture against anti-colonial combatants (see p. 80 for Madagascar, and p. 109 for Algeria). The final chapters outline the ways in which the army’s vision of a colonial future struggled against the pace of political reform, and was ultimately forced to contend with its redundancy. In West Africa, the army wanted to act as an organization regulating the pace of change, trying to put down roots (such as the establishment of national armies) which could ensure that their influence was maintained. Ginio shows that this complex period of wrangling was the basis of the ‘*lingering military aspect of France’s relations with its ex-colonies*’ (p. xviii), as the realities of neo-colonialism persisted after political independence.

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Hal Brands, *Making the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War Order*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2016; ix + 469 pp.; £22.99 hbk; ISBN 9781501702723

The ‘*crisis of confidence*’ in the USA during the 1970s fostered widespread talk of the decline of US power. As late as 1987, in his comparative study of historical empires, historian Paul M. Kennedy warned that both of the empires of his own time, the USA and the Soviet Union, suffered from imperial overstretch and suggested that the USA could be the first to collapse.¹² As it became clear only a few years later, Kennedy was right about the Soviet Union, but concern about US decline was misplaced.

In *Making the Unipolar Moment* Hal Brands seeks to explain how the USA turned around its fortunes, from the malaise of the 1970s, to its unforeseen

¹² P.M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York, NY 1987).

global primacy in the post-Cold War world. On a broader level, the book is concerned with the relationship between structure and the strategic agency of policymakers in shaping international developments. Rather than offering yet another story of the end of the Cold War, Brands contends that the book takes 'a more holistic approach' (p. 4) that situates late superpower struggle in global changes such as international political economy, democratization, and terrorism. In other words, this is an extraordinarily ambitious book grabbing with a broad scope. Brands' main argument is that US resurgence was the result of the interaction between structure and strategy, as US policymakers harnessed favourable structural forces to their advantage to bring about the unipolar moment.

The bulk of the book focuses on the 1980s bookended by an opening chapter on the 1970s and a closing chapter on the emerging post-Cold War order under the George H.W. Bush administration. The four chapters on the 1980s adopt thematic frameworks to examine the relationship between US strategy and structural developments in the international environment. Chapter Two examines the transformation of superpower relations, with Brands emphasizing how the Reagan administration 'turned structural opportunity into successful strategy' (p. 117). Chapter Three investigates the global advances of democratization and how the Reagan administration, after an initial phase of scepticism, undertook a range of policies to advance the spread of democracy. Chapter Four traces the rise of neo-liberalism in the international political economy and how the Reagan administration sought to advance this process by promoting free-market reforms and economic globalization. Providing the antithesis to the general narrative of developments favourable to the interests of the USA, Chapter Five details the rise of terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East and the failure of US policymakers to counter this trend.

Throughout the book, Brands points to the shortcomings of US statecraft, including how it sometimes inadvertently created new challenges further down the road. On balance, however, Brands' verdict on the performance of the US policymakers in question is positive. Brands clearly reveres the statecraft of the Reagan and Bush administrations, describing US strategy during their tenures as 'historically potent and perceptive' (p. 11). Undoubtedly, some scholars will take issue with such a positive assessment and point to the downsides of US foreign policy felt in many countries. To Brands' credit, however, *Making the Unipolar Moment* does not ignore the considerable human costs the USA brought about in places such as Central America.

Brands demonstrates how US strategy successfully shaped the international environment in areas where structural developments were favourable to US interests, but he points out that US strategy failed in the Middle East where structural changes worked against its interests. Ultimately, does this then indicate that policymakers can hope to harness favourable structures but are powerless in resisting unfavourable ones? In other words, might Brands be too optimistic on behalf of US policymakers' ability to shape international affairs?

While other scholars have already covered separate elements of Brands' book, few if any have provided such a comprehensive yet succinct narrative of the rise of US power. The book is particularly relevant to readers seeking to understand the evolution of US statecraft from the late 1970s to the early 1990s in the context of structural changes in the international system such as democratization and globalization. Moreover, the book offers a fresh examination of how structure and strategy interact to create change. A minor complaint is the absence of a bibliography, which makes it difficult for readers to gain an overview of the impressive body of literature covered in the book.

In conclusion, Brands has written a densely-researched, well-structured, and persuasive book that will be of interest to anyone researching the Cold War, US foreign policy, and contemporary international history. At a time when Paul M. Kennedy's admonitions about US decline echo again, Brands' book provides a guide to how previous policymakers crafted a resurgence of US power.

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Dagmar Herzog, *Cold War Freud – Psychoanalysis in an Age of Catastrophes*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017; viii + 311 pp.; £24.99 hbk; ISBN 9781107072398

Halfway through Dagmar Herzog's *Cold War Freud* we hear the Nobel Prize-winning Konrad Lorenz whimper that murder had never been his intention (p. 147), as if the language of his theories and membership in the Nazi Party were mere flukes on the way to a biologized theory of aggression. Of course, Herzog resists the tempting ploy of historical prurience. She shows, point by point, how Alexander Mitscherlich brought psychoanalysis back to Germany: he located it midpoint between the country's post-1945 recovery through resentful victim blaming, and the official psychoanalytic position on aggression as universal. Melanie Klein was revived along the way and Lorenz instrumentalized, while Freud was transformed into a joyless pessimist.

Whether it is the character of psychoanalysis, or of culture(s), the latter's ability to appropriate elements of the former is replicated with uncanny frequency. Even more complex, Herzog argues, is the pull within institutional psychoanalysis between social conformity and counter-culture activism. A distinguished professor of history at the City University of New York, Dagmar Herzog explores this tension in a series of mid-to late-twentieth century 'catastrophes'. When the USA gained postwar affluence and found organized religion (Christian), psychoanalysis rejected Karen Horney's independence – and to be blunt, women – in favor of desexualized normativity. When the country doubled over with indignation at the publication of the Kinsey Reports, official psychoanalysis broke with Freud to join the homophobic consensus. Though psychiatrists restored some honor to their field in revisiting Kraepelinian categories and, in 1973, eliminating homosexuality as a diagnosable pathology, their psychoanalytic colleagues self-assuredly took to individualism, narcissism and character disorders. At the same time, and although